Abstract. Stability arises as the consistency criterion in a betting interpretation for hyperreal imprecise previsions, that is imprecise previsions (and probabilities) which may take infinitesimal values. The purpose of this work is to extend the notion of stable coherence introduced in [8] to conditional hyperreal imprecise probabilities. Our investigation extends the de Finetti-Walley operational characterisation of (imprecise) prevision to conditioning on events which are considered "practically impossible" but not "logically impossible".
Introduction and Motivation
This paper combines, within a logico-algebraic setting, several extensions of the imprecise probability framework which we aim to generalise so as to represent infinitesimal imprecise probabilities on fuzzy events.
Imprecise conditional probabilities, as well as imprecise conditional previsions, have been investigated in details by Walley [12] in the case where the conditioning event ψ is boolean and has non-zero lower probability. There, a de Finetti-style interpretation of upper and lower probability and of upper and lower prevision in terms of bets is proposed. In Walley's approach, the conditional upper prevision, U (x|ψ) of the gamble x given the event ψ is defined to be a number α such that U (x ψ · (x − α)) = 0, where x ψ = 1 if ψ is true and x ψ = 0 if ψ is false. When the lower probability of ψ is non-zero, there is exactly one α satisfying the above condition, and hence, the upper conditional prevision is well-defined. Likewise, the lower conditional prevision of x given ψ is the unique β such that L(x ψ · (x − β)) = 0. However, the uniqueness of α and β is only guaranteed if the lower probability of ψ is not zero, otherwise, there might be infinitely many solutions of the above equations.
In terms of bets, the rationality of an assessment of upper probabilities (or of upper previsions) corresponds to the absence of inadmissible bets, that is, of bets for which there is an alternative strategy for the gambler which ensures to him a strictly better payoff whatever the outcome of the experiment will be. In the case of conditional upper and lower previsions, however, the absence of inadmissible bets might be due to the fact that the conditioning event has lower probability zero (remind that when the conditioning event is false the bet is invalidated, and hence the payoff of any bet on the conditional event is zero). So, the presence of events with lower probability zero might force the absence of inadmissible bets even in non-rational assessments. For instance, if we chose a point at random on the surface of Earth, and φ denotes the event: the point belongs to the western hemisphere and ψ denotes the event the point belongs to the equator, the assessment φ|ψ → 0, ¬φ|ψ → 0 avoids inadmissible bets (in case the point does not belong to the equator), but is not rational.
The goals of this paper are the following:
(1) To provide for a treatment of conditional upper and lower previsions when the conditioning event is many-valued and when the conditioning event has probability zero. For probabilities in the usual sense, this goal has been pursued in [8] .
(2) To model conditional or unconditional bets in which truth values and betting odds may be non-standard. In particular, to every non-zero event with probability zero we assign an infinitesimal non-zero probability, so that we may avoid conditioning events with probability zero. Then taking standard parts we obtain a probability (or, in the case of many-valued events, a state) in the usual sense.
(3) The basic idea is the following: we replace the concept of coherence (absence of inadmissible bets) by a stronger concept, namely, stable coherence. Not only inadmissible bets are ruled out, but, in addition, the absence of inadmissible bets is preserved if we modify the assessment by an infinitesimal in such a way that no lower probability assessments equal to zero are allowed for events which are not impossible. The main result (Theorem 5) will be that stable coherence for an assessment of conditional upper probability corresponds to the existence of a non-standard upper probability which extends the assessment modulo an infinitesimal and assigns a non-zero lower probability to all non-zero events.
Our main result has important foundational consequences. For stable coherence allows us to distinguish between events which are regarded as practically impossible and events which are indeed logically impossible. It is well-known that this subtle but crucial difference can only be captured by so-called regular probability functions which are characterised by Shimony's notion of strict coherence. A companion paper will address this point in full detail.
For reasons of space all proofs are omitted from this version of the paper.
Algebraic Structures for Non-standard Probability
We build on [8] , which can be consulted for further background on MV-algebra and related structures. functions from a set X into a non-standard extension, R * , of R. Hence, their elements may be interpreted as bounded random variables (also called gambles in [12] ). The set of bounded random variables is closed under sum, subtraction and under the lattice operations. Since we are interested in extending the framework of [8] to imprecise conditional prevision and probability, we also need a product operation. It turns out that appropriate structure is constituted by the c-s-u-f integral domains. (ii) (R, +, −, ·, 0, 1) is a commutative ring with neutral element 1.
Remark 1. In [7] it is shown that every c-s-u-f integral domain embeds into an algebra of the form (R * fin ) H , where R * is an ultrapower of the real field, R fin is the c-s-u-f domain consisting of all finite elements of R * , and H is an index set 3 . In particular, every c-s-u-f integral domain embeds into the product of totally ordered integral domains, and this fact justifies the name of these structures.
Let (G, u) be a unital lattice ordered group. We define Γ (G, u) to be the algebra whose domain is the interval [0, u] , with the constant 0 and with the operations ∼ x = u − x and x ⊕ y = (x + y) ∧ u. Moreover if h is a homomorphism of unital lattice ordered abelian groups (G, u) and (G , u ) (i.e., a homomorphism of lattice ordered groups such that h(u) = u ), we define Γ (h) to be the restriction of h to Γ (G, u). Likewise, given a c-s-u-f integral domain (F, u) and denoting by F − the underlying lattice ordered abelian group, we define
Theorem 1. (1) (see [10]). Γ is a functor from the category of unital lattice ordered abelian groups into the category of MV-algebras. Moreover Γ has an adjoint
Γ −1 such that the pair (Γ, Γ −1 )
is an equivalence of categories. (2) (see [7]). Γ R is a functor from the category of c-s-u-f integral domains into the category of PMV
Remark 2. Theorem 1 tells us that the algebra of gambles, represented by a unital lattice ordered abelian group or of a c-s-u-f integral domain, is completely determined by the algebra of [0, u]-valued gambles, whose elements may be regarded as many-valued events. MV and PMV + -algebras provide rich semantics for the logic of many-valued events.
Let A be an MV-algebra, and let (G, u) be a lattice ordered unital abelian group such that Γ (G, u) = A. Let R * be an ultrapower of the real field, and let R * fin be the set of all finite elements of R * and let [0, 1] 
In [8] , the following result is shown:
It follows:
In the sequel, we will need MV-algebras with product or c-s-u-f domains in order to treat conditional probability in an algebraic setting. Moreover we need to treat probabilities in terms of bets in such a way that zero probabilities will be replaced by infinitesimal probabilities. We would like to have a richer structure in which not only MV-operations or lattice ordered group operations, but also product and hyperreal numbers are present. The construction presented in the next lines provides for such structures. [8] .
Fuzzy Imprecise Probabilities over the Hyperreals
We are now in a position to introduce the notion of fuzzy imprecise hyperprevisions, which, as usual, lead in a special case, to probabilities. We will focus on upper hyper previsions and probabilities (lower notions will be obtained as usual). Naturally enough, our first step requires us to extend propositional valuations to the hyperreals.
Definition 3. Let (G, u) be a unital lattice ordered abelian group and suppose that R
fin and x, y ∈ G * , the following conditions hold:
(
* and for all x, y ∈ A * , the following conditions hold:
Definition 4.
An upper hyperprevision is a function U * on G * which satisfies (2) , (4), (5) , with P * replaced by U * , and 
Remark 3.
(1) A valuation on a lattice ordered abelian group G * (resp., on A * ) is a homomorphism v from G * into R (resp., from A into [0, 1] P MV ) such that v(α) = α for every standard real α. Moreover, a prevision on G * is a map into R which satisfies (2), (3) and (4), as well as (1) Moreover, an upper prevision on G * is a map into R which satisfies (2), (4) and (3)', as well as (1)' and (6) for all standard α and (5) 
is an upper hyperstate and L * 0 is its corresponding lower hyperstate and if
We now present a betting interpretation of hyper upper previsions, which will lead to the appropriate notion of coherence. We begin by recalling a characterisation of coherence as avoiding inadmissible bets given in [6] (the terminology "bad bet" was used there.) random variables x 1 , . . . , x 
An inadmissible bet is an inadmissible W bet, where W is the set of all valuations on (G, u).
The assessment Λ is said to be W coherent if it excludes inadmissible W -bets, and coherent if it excludes inadmissible bets.
In [6] it is shown that an assessment of upper probability avoids inadmissible bets iff it can be extended to an upper prevision. The result was shown first, although in a different setting, by Walley in [12] .
In [6] it is also shown that given gambles x 1 , . . . , x m and given an upper prevision U , for i = 1, . . . , m there is a prevision P i such that P i (x i ) = U (x i ) and P i (x) ≤ U (x) for every gamble x. Moreover, as shown in [11] , there are valuations v i,j and non-negative reals λ j,
In other words, we can assume that each P i is a convex combination of valuations.
Hence, coherence for upper previsions is equivalent to the following condition: 
In words, Λ avoids inadmissible bets iff there are m convex combinations,
The result above 4 may be extended to non-standard assessments, to hypervaluations and to upper hyper previsions. First of all, we consider a (G, u)-amenable ultrapower, R * , of R, and we set G * = Π(G, u, R * fin ). Then we consider a hyperassessment Λ := x 1 → α 1 , . . . , x n → α n with x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ G * . Let W be a set of hypervaluations. We say that Λ is W -coherent if it rules out inadmissible W -bets, that is, for i = 1, . . . , n and for every λ, λ 1 , . . . , λ n ≥ 0, there is a hy- 
Mi , and let Λ 0 be the assessment: 
We express this fact saying that Λ is the supremum of m convex combinations of m + 1 hypervaluations
We conclude this section with a result that, up to infinitesimals, a coherent assessment can be extended by a faithful upper hyperprevision (an upper hyperprevision U * is faithful if U * (x) = 1 implies x = 1, or equivalently if L * (x) = 0 implies x = 0, where L * (x) = 1 − U * (¬x) is the lower prevision associated to U * ). 4 Conditional Imprecise Non-standard Probabilities [9] gives the following betting interpretation of conditional probability: when the conditioning event ψ is many-valued, we assume that betting on φ|ψ is like betting on φ with the proviso that only a part of the bet proportional to the truth value v(ψ) of ψ will be valid. Hence, the gambler's payoff corresponding to the bet λ in a conditional bet on φ|ψ is λv(ψ)(v(φ) − α), where α is the betting odd. If λ = 1, and if we identify any formula with its truth value, the payoff is expressed by ψ(φ − α). Hence, the upper conditional probability of φ given ψ is obtained by imposing the upper prevision of the payoff to be zero. That is, the upper conditional probability U * 0 (φ|ψ) of φ given ψ must be a number α such that U * (ψ(φ − α)) = 0, where U * is the unique upper hyperprevision which extends U * 0 . A desirable condition is that for a given hyper upper probability U * 0 there is a unique α such that U * 0 (ψ(φ − α)) = 0. Clearly one cannot expect this condition to hold when for instance U * 0 (ψ) = 0. Indeed, the random variable φ − α is bounded (it takes values in [−1, 1]), and hence for any choice of α
This equality holds independently of α, and hence we are in the bad situation where any α might serve as an upper probability of φ|ψ. We will see that such an inadmissible situation is avoided when U * 0 (¬ψ) < 1, or equivalently, when the lower prevision L * 0 (ψ) is strictly positive. The argument used to prove the lemma shows that if L * 0 (ψ) = L * (ψ) > 0, then the upper conditional probability U * 0 (φ|ψ), if it exists, can be uniquely recovered from the (unconditional) upper hyperstate U * 0 . In the standard case, such a conditional upper probability is shown to exist by a continuity argument, while it is not clear whether it exists in the non-standard case (we have shown uniqueness, not existence). However, for a given finite assessment we will prove that such a conditional upper probability exists, in a sense which will be made precise in Theorem 5 below. Before discussing it, we introduce completeness. The requirement of a betting odd β on the negation of the conditioning event and not on the conditioning event itself may look strange. However, imposing a betting odd for the upper hyperprevision of the negation of ψ is the same as imposing the betting odd 1 − β for the lower hyperprevision of ψ. So, in a complete assessment we really impose conditions on the lower prevision of the conditioning event.
Stable coherence is the consistency criterion for conditional hyper upper probabilities: when the probability assigned to the conditioning events is 0, it is quite possible that any assignment to conditional events avoids inadmissible bets. Now stable coherence says that inadmissible bets are also avoided if the bookmaker changes the lower probabilities of the conditioning events by an infinitesimal so that a positive number is assigned to them. Our main theorem shows that stable coherence corresponds to faithful upper hyperprevisions. 
